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Reception of the Common Law in Missouri:
Section 1.010 as Interpreted by the Supreme
Court of Missouri
Joseph FredBenson*
What is the significance ofthe phrase "fourth year of the reign ofJames the
First," and how has the Supreme Court of Missouri interpreted Missouri's
reception statute of the common law?
This is an article of first impression, the very essence of which is to explore
the meaning of Missouri's reception statute of the common law as embodied
within the four comers of Missouri Revised Statutes Section 1.010. How we
think of our reception statute and the meaning of the "common law" will, to a
degree, shape the future of the law, its institutions, and ultimately our lives.
Missouri's reception of the common law is codified under Missouri Revised
Statutes Section 1.010 (2000). The statute reads:
The common law of England and all statutes and acts of parliament
made prior to the fourth year of the reign of James the First, of a
general nature, which are local to that kingdom and not repugnant to
or inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, the
constitution of this state, or the statute laws in force for the time being,
are the rule of action and decision in this state, any custom or usage to
the contrary notwithstanding, but no act of the general assembly or
law of this state shall be held to be invalid, or limited in its scope or
effect by the courts of this state, for the reason that it is in derogation
of, or in conflict with, the common law, or with such statutes or acts
of parliament; but all acts of the general assembly, or laws, shall be
liberally construed, so as to effectuate the true intent and meaning
thereof.
This Article discusses the significance of the phrase "fourth year of the
reign of James the First" in Missouri's reception statute of the common law.
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I. THE HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE PRESENT STATUTE

When France ceded the Louisiana Territory to the United States in 1803,'
civil law was the rule of decision. In the wake of France's cessation of
Louisiana to the United States, a violent conflict occurred "between the citizens,
who were attached to their law [civil law] on the one side, and the government,
along with the new immigrants, that wanted to introduce the common law."2 To
quell the unrest in the new territory, the federal government recognized "the
need to bend with the will of the people and to clarify the existing law."3 To this
end, the federal government established a commission in 1806 to codify the law
of Louisiana.' If there was a doubt as to what legal system governed the new
territory, Judge John Prevost of the Superior Court of the Territory of Orleans
"decreed that Roman, Spanish, and French civil law would be enforced as the
customary law of the territory in all cases."' A year later, in 1806, Governor
Claiborne muddied the waters as to whose law governed when he "vetoed a bill
enacted by the Legislature ofthe Territory of Orleans that would have provided
for the statutory reception of Spanish law."7 The issue became what civil law
system controlled the Louisiana territory?8 In 1808, the Civil Code, termed A
Digest of the Civil Laws now in force in the territory of Orleans, became a

reality; but the code was not based upon Spanish law; its flavor was distinctly
Napoleonic. 9 Not until 1816 did Missouri's territorial legislature enact its first
1. See Treaty Between the United States ofAmerica and the French Republic, April
30, 1803, U.S.-Fr., in 2 Treaties and Other InternationalActs of the United States of
America Document 28 (HunterMiller ed., 1931); DANIELJ. BOORSTIN, THEAMERICANS:
THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 257-58 (1965).
2. Jose Marii Castin Vazquez, ReciprocalInfluences Between the Law of Spain
and Louisiana,42 LA. L. REV. 1473, 1477 (1982).

3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See Raphael J. Rabalais, The Influence of Spanish Laws and Treatises on the
JurisprudenceofLouisiana: 1762-1828, 42 LA. L. REV. 1485, 1492 (1982).
6. Governor Claiborne's full name was William C. C. Claibome. See Philip F.
Dur, "Louisiana and the Code ofNapoleon,"at http://www.ucs.louisiana.edu/-pfd2009/
bar-jrnl.html.
7. Rabalais, supranote 5, at 1492. In Cottin v. Cottin, 5 Mart. (O.S.) 93, 94 (La.
1817), the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the Code of 1808 did not drive out all of
the old Spanish law thus bringing to an end the debate of whose law controlled.
8. See, e.g., Elizabeth Gaspar Brown, LegalSystems in Conflict: OrleansTerritory

1804-1812, 1 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 35 (1957), quotedin Rabalais, supranote 5, at 1493

n.18.
9. See Rabalais, supra note 5, at 1493 n. 18; Roscoe Pound, The Influence of
FrenchLaw in America, 3 ILL. L. REV. 354, 359-60 (1909). Dean Pound attributes four
factors that led to the influence of French law in early American legal culture, namely:
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss3/3
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reception statute."° The 1816 act lasted until 1825. During that brief period the

(1) the rise of the law merchant (lex mercatoria);(2) the hostility towards England and
English institutions during the latterhalfofthe eighteenth century; (3) the great influence
during the first half of the nineteenth century of Justice Story and Chancellor Kent who
freely cited to French law in their opinions and treatises; and (4) the "movement for
reform in practice and pleading which created great dissatisfaction with the common law
at a time when the effects of the other causes were making themselves felt." Id. at 355.
At the time of the American Revolution, the law merchant had not been fully
incorporated into the body of English common law; this despite the efforts of Lord
Mansfield to whom "that result is chiefly, if not entirely, due." Id. Though French law
had an initial impact on Louisiana, that influence waned during the nineteenth century.
By 1908, Louisiana decisions and American decisions outside of Louisianahad relegated
the influence of French law to a mere sixty-seven cases. Id. at 359 n.24, citing 120 La.
(1908). The theory that Dean Pound articulated in his 1909 IllinoisLaw Review article
has survived the test of time and historical debate. See Lawrence M. Friedman, HISTORY
OF AMERICAN LAw 108-09 (2d ed. 1985); Lawrence M. Friedman, AMERICAN LAW 44
(1984). ; Hickman v. Boffinan, 3 Ky. 356, 364-65 (1808). In Hickman, the ChiefJustice
of Kentucky interrupted Henry Clay's argument, reminding him that the state legislature
had enacted a law prohibiting the reading in open court, and the citation to, any"[r]eports
and books containing adjudged cases, in the kingdom of Great Britain, which decisions
have taken place since the 4th day of July, 1776.' Id. at 372 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Hickman exemplifies the hostility by early Americans toward post-1776
English concepts, including the common law. Nor was anti-English common law
sentiment confinedto the western frontier. In 1776, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
repealed the common law, but soon found that they had thrown the baby out with the
bath water. In 1777, the Commonwealth revived the common law up to and including
May 14, 1776. See Act of January 28, 1777, § 2, in Purdon's Digest 1700-1861, at 40
(Frederick C. Brightly ed., 1862); Respublica v. Chapman, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 53, 58 (Pa.

1781).
10. See An Act Declaring What Laws Shall Be in Force in This Territory, 1816
Mo. LAWS 32 (Jan. 19, 1816). In 1804, Congress divided the Louisiana Territory into
two districts. Lower Louisiana remained under the civil law jurisdiction, while the
Indiana Territory under the common law initially governed Upper Louisiana, which
became the District of Missouri. See Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1787 § 4, 1 Stat.
51 (1787). Not until 1812, however, did Congress enact legislation providing for the
establishment of a government for the new Territory ofMissouri. See An Act Providing
for the Government of the Territory of Missouri, ch. 95, 2 Stat. 743 (1812). The act of
1812 did not provide for the reception ofthe common law. The congressional legislation
of 1812, does, however, carry over the laws and regulations of"the territory of Louisiana,
at the commencement of this act, and not inconsistent with the provisions thereof...
until altered, modified or repealed by the general assembly." Id. § 16; see also Justice
BrentE. Dickson, Indiana'sConstitutionalPast,Address at the Indiana State Library and
Historical Building (Dec. 8,1996), athttp'//www.statelib.lib.in.us/www/ihb/publications/
dickson.html. Despite the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which adopted the common law
as the rule of decision in the territory, Indiana did not enact a common law reception
statute until 1852. See IND. CODE ANN. § 1-1-2-1 (Michie 1998); Grimes' Ex'rs v.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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territorial reception statute read in pertinent part:
The common law of England, which is of a general nature and all
statutes made by the British parliament in aid of or to supply the
defects of the said common law, made prior to the fourth year of the
reign of James the first, and of a general nature, and not local to that
kingdom, which said common law and statutes are not contrary to the
laws of the territory, and are not repugnant to, nor inconsistent with
the constitution and laws of the United States shall be the rule of
decision in this territory."
Early Missouri cases that involved statutory interpretation of the 1816 act
were the Spanish land grant suits.' 2 Landes v. Perkins"3 is one of the many
Spanish land grant suits that were decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri
during its formative years. At issue was whether or not the Spanish law of
abandonment prevailed in the Missouri Territory prior to 1816.14 Holding that
Spanish law applied to the case at bar, the court noted that prior to the Act of
January 19, 1816, common law had not been introduced into the territory. This
is the extent of the court's discussion of the 1816 act. The opinion offers no
direct or indirect mention of Jamestown (which the Author believes is vital to
understanding the reception of the common law) as grounds for the reception
statute. Nor does the court give an explanation as to why the reception statute
adopted the common law prior to the fourth year of the reign of James the First. 5
In Baker's Administratorv. Crandall,6 the court refers to the reception statute
and Chancellor Kent's Commentaries on the law, 7 but the court's opinion and
Kent's Commentaries are void of historical analysis." Though these cases are

Harmon, 35 nd. 198, 237 (1871), overruledinpartby Erskine v. Whitehead, 84 Ind. 357
(1882).
11. 1816 Mo. LAWS 32 (emphasis added).
12. See, e.g., Lindell v. McNair, 4 Mo. 380, 381 (1836) (addressing the law of
coverture and conveyance under the Spanish land grants); Picotte v. Cooley, 10 Mo. 312
(1847) (following the rule articulated in Lindell regarding the Spanish law of real and
personal property acquired during the course of marriage).
13. 12 Mo. 238 (1848).
14. Id. at 256-57.
15. Id. at 257; see also Riddick v. Walsh, 15 Mo. 519, 525, 534 (1852).
16. 78 Mo. 584 (1883) (survival action).
17. See 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 473 (1st ed. 18261830); Baker's Adm 'r, 78 Mo. at 586-87.
18. See Julius Goebel, Jr., King'sLaw and Local Custom in Seventeenth Century
New England,31 COLUM. L. REV. 416,416 n.2 (193 1) (observing that there has been no
comprehensive discussion regarding the relation of the reception statutes to the judicial
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss3/3
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rich in Missouri and American history, they provide no meaningful analysis of
the statute. Nor does nineteenth-century case law provide a sound definition of
what the common law is, because it is couched in romantic terminology: "Our
ancestors, when they came into this new world, claimed the common law as their
birthright."' 9 In Elks Investment Co. v. Jones," the Supreme Court of Missouri
held: "When Missouri came into the Union of the states under its first
Constitution, it brought with it the common law which it had adopted as a
territory in 1816. ' But this is as far as the court's historical analysis goes in
interpreting the reception statute. In this respect, Elks Investment is akin to the
nineteenth-century decisions framing the adoption of the common law in

romantic terms. 2'
A. The 1825 Reception Statute
On February 12, 1825, the Missouri General Assembly repealed the
territorial reception statute of 1816 and enacted in lieu thereofMissouri's second
reception statute, which is carried forward in Missouri Revised Statutes Section
1.010.1 The act of 1825 omitted the 1816 phrase that read, "The common law
of England... made by the British parliament in aid of or to supply the defects
of the said common law."2 Decisions of the Supreme Court of Missouri have
not addressed why this change occurred.
B. "Made PriorTo The Fourth Year ofJames I, 1607"
Fifty years ago Professor William L. Eckhardt proffered: "The date
selected [1607] has reference to the fnrst permanent English settlement in the
new world."' R. T. Barton's edition of Sir John Randolph's Virginia Colonial

elaboration of the actual details surrounding them).
19. See, e.g., Sackett v. Sackett, 25 Mass. 309, 329 (1829) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Knowlton, 2 Mass. 530, 534 (1807)); State v. Campbell, T.U.P.
Charlton, 166, at 167 (Ga. 1808); Baker's Adm'r., 78 Mo. at 586-87.
20. 187 S.W. 71 (Mo. 1916).
21. Id. at 74.
22. See, e.g., Barry v. Village ofPort Jervis, 72N.Y.S. 104,112 (1901) (describing
the common law of England as "derivedfrom immemorialusageandcUstom") (emphasis
added); M'Cord v. Ochiltree, 8 Blackf. 15, 19-20 (Ind. 1846), overruled in part by
Grimes' Ex'rs v. Harmon, 35 Ind. 198 (1871); Jesse Root, Observations Upon the
Government andLaws of Connecticut: On the Common Law of Connecticut, 1 Root i,
ix, at xii (Conn. 1798). See generally 15A C.J.S., Common Law, § 11 (1967).
23. See 1825 Mo.LAWs 491.
24. 1816 Mo. LAWS 32.
25. William L. Eckhardt, Property, 17 Mo. L. REv. 398, 398-99 (1952); see also
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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Decisions supports the Eckhardt proposition. The Supreme Court ofTennessee
reached the same conclusion during the early years of the twentieth century.26
1. Jamestown Charter
Prior to the Susan Constant27 setting sail from London on December 20,
1606, to the New World, William Fitzhugh, a merchant, planter, shipper, and
lawyer, was retained by King James the First to draft the charter for the future
Jamestown colony.28 Referring to His Majesty's instructions in drafting the
charter for Jamestown, Fitzhugh explains that James I directed that "the laws of
the colony 'be in substance consistent with the laws of England or the equity'
hereof."29 Colonel Fitzhugh then disputed the contention "that the Laws and

2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 35:4, at 56-57 (Norman
J. Singer ed., 6th ed. 2001). Professor Singer takes the view that the year 1606 or 1607
was adopted by the colonies as the dateline for reception of the common law to mark
either "the year in which the Virginia Company of London dispatched the expedition
which settled Jamestown, or 1607, the date of their arrival in America." Id. § 35:4, at 57.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky has adopted a different view regarding the reception of
the common law. In Ray v. Sweeney, 77 Ky. 1 (1878), the court held that in 1607, James
the First "sought to enforce in this state [then part of Virginia] any rule of English
common law." Id. at 10. Because of this fact, and the staunch independence of the
colonies, Kentucky's reception statute ofthe common law reads "prior to the fourth year
of James the First." KEN. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.080(1) (Michie 1999). Missouri case
law is void of such analysis.
26. See Moss v. State, 173 S.W. 859, 861 (Tenn. 1915). Moss and other state
supreme court opinions are discussed infra Part II, infra.
27. See

I

SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON ET AL., THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN

REPUBLIC 39 (6th ed. 1969). The Susan Constant was one of three ships under the
command of Captain Christopher Newport that "dropped down the Thames at
Christmastide 1606" for the "Virginia Voyage." Id. The other two ships that set sail
from London to Virginia were Godspeed and Discovery. Id.
28. See 1 SIR JOHN RANDOLPH & EDWARD BARRADALL, VIRGINIA COLONIAL
DECISIONS: 1728-1732, at 159 (R.T. Barton ed., 1909); Goebel, supranote 18, at 416.
Professor Goebel makes a two-point argument. First, the royal charter with its "mandate
that the law in the lands granted should be agreeable or not repugnant to the law of
England, is commonly regarded as a forecast of what was to transpire." Goebel, supra
note 18, at 416 (citation omitted). Second, the reception statute, "with its declaration that
the common law ofEngland, in so far as it had been adopted at a particular date, was the
law of a state, is held to have marked the consummation of the forecast." Goebel, supra
note 18, at 416. Though Missouri is not one of the original thirteen states founded by
royal charter, the question arises, must we look to the Treaty of St. Ildefonso of October
1, 1800 in which Spain ceded Louisiana to France as a forecast of what was to transpire
before we can interpret our reception statute?
29. 1 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra note 28, at 160.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss3/3
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Statutes of England were not binding to us here, except such statutes wherein we
are particularly named."3 Fitzhugh's argument is historically and legally sound,
due to the 3000 miles of ocean between colony and mother country, and the
difference in interpretation of the common law in England, as opposed to the
New World.
Missouri's 1825 reception statute, and the present statute adopting the
common law as found in Missouri Revised Statutes Section 1.010, do not mirror
Virginia's broad reception statute of 1606. 3' When one speaks ofthe pioneering
Missourians or the colonials of the eighteenth century, there is an undeniable
truth: British colonists and the founders of Missouri placed limitations on the
long arm of the common law.32
The limitations on the common law stem from Sir Edward Coke's opinion
in Calvin s Case,33 an opinion that drew a distinction between lands conquered
from Christians and those taken from infidels. British colonial plantation owners
viewed themselves as Englishmen with all the rights and privileges of the
common law, and not as infidels to be treated differently than Englishmen living
on the isle. Even after 1720, when Coke's dichotomy fell by the wayside, his
dichotomy "continued to influence the debate over the authority of British
statutes right up to the Revolution." 4
Another limitation upon the common law, once thought to have defined the
history of state reception statutes, was Coke's opinion in Fuller's Case,"
'
holding: "That the King is not under man, but is under God and the laws."36
Fuller'sCase articulates the modem concept: the rule of law. It does not define
why Missouri adopted the common law prior to the fourth year of the reign of
James the First.
C. The Regnal Calendarand 1607
When we speak in terms ofprior to the fourth year of the reign ofJames the
First, we must adjust our calendar back in time to the Age of the Stuarts when
the Julian calendar was the dateline in England. Under the Julian calendar

30. 1 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supranote 28, at 160.
31. See 1816 Mo. LAWs 32; 1825 Mo. LAws 491.
32. See MORTON J. HORWlTZ, THETRANSFORMATION
33. 7 Coke's Rep. I (C.P. 1608).

OF AMERICAN LAW 6

(1977).

34. HORWlTZ, supra note 32, at 6.

35. 12 Coke's Rep. 65 (C.P. 1607).
36. The Latin is "quod Rex non debet esse sub homine sed sub deo et lege." See
also FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 269

(Ist ed. 1908, 1974 reprint) (H.A.L. Fisher, ed.).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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March 24 was the last day of the year, and March 25 was the first day ofthe new
year. This changed in 1752 when England adopted the Gregorian calendar.37
D. Statutes Which Are General,and Not Local
As early as 1681, Sir William Jones, as the attorney-general for the Colony
of Virginia, issued an opinion which rejected the concept that Parliament could
enact laws for the colony or any plantation in the New World which did not
expressly name Virginia." A primary reason for adopting general rather than
local laws was the firm belief that absent naming the colonies or plantations in
an act of parliament, there was a presumption that the act lacked particularity39
and, therefore, was local to the kingdom. Missouri and other states adhere to this
early legal opinion.'

II. MISSOURI SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
The opinions of the Supreme Court of Missouri have not definitively
addressed the meaning of Missouri Revised Statutes Section 1.010. Osborne v.
Purdome4' was a criminal contempt case in which petitioners argued that
purgation by oath entitled them to be discharged from their convictions.
Rejecting this argument, the court observed that purgation by oath was not
known to the common law in 1607.42 Kansas City v. Bibbs43 involved an
ordinance violation charging attempt to obtain money through false pretense."4
Bibbs quotes the court's opinion in Osborne for the proposition that Missouri
adopted the common law made prior to the fourth year of James the First.4'

37. See Chronology ofDating,at http://www.medievalgenealogy.org.uk/guide
chron.shtnl.
38. 1 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra note 28, at 160.
39. 1 RANDOLPH &BARRADALL, supra note 28, at 160.
40. See Osborne v. Purdome, 244 S.W.2d 1005 (Mo. 1952), cert. denied,343 U.S.
953 (1952); Indus. Acceptance Corp. v. Webb, 287 S.W. 657, 660 (Mo. Ct. App. 1926).
These cases are discussed infra Part II; see also Moss v. State, 173 S.W. 859, 861 (Tenn.
1915). See Appendix for a collection of state reception statutes.
41. 244 S.W.2d 1005 (Mo. 1952), cert. denied,343 U.S. 953 (1952).
42. Id. at 1011; see also Charles P. Curtis, Jr. & Richard C.Curtis, The Story ofa
Notion in the Law of CriminalContempt, 41 HARV. L. REv. 51, 60 (1927) ("the notion
probably arose after 1641 and sometime before 1682"). Though purgation by oath is
found as early as 1419 in England, the common law courts did not adopt it until 1650.
Curtisand Curtis at 62 n.39. The opinion in Osborne does not reflect this fact.
43. 548 S.W.2d 264 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
44. Id. at 265.
45. Id. at 267.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss3/3
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Bibbs, however, is not instructive regarding the meaning of Missouri's reception
statute. IndustrialAcceptance Corp. v. Webb' was an action to recover an
amount due with interest. IndustrialAcceptance Corp. is instructive from the
historical perspective that allowance of interest due on a promissory note existed
in Elizabethan England.47 The opinion falls short, however, in historical analysis
of why Missouri adopted the common law of England prior to the fourth year of
the reign of James the First. These Missouri cases and those discussed above
(i.e., the Spanish land grant cases), do not address the connection between the
drafting of the Jamestown charter, nor do they speak to why the reception statute
has not been definitively interpreted as being historically tied to the founding of
Jamestown.
A. Equity and The Reception Statute
In Dickey v. Volker,' s a will contest case that centered around the law of
charitable trusts, the Supreme Court of Missouri addressed whether early
chancery proceedings announced common law rules within the meaning of the
reception statute.49 Rejecting appellant's argument that equity principles were
part of the common law as adopted by Missouri, 0 the court looked to Williams
v. Miles,5 a 1903 Nebraska Supreme Court decision definingthe common law. 2
The court in Dickey held that chancery, Roman, or Civil law is not included in
the definition of what is the common law.53 What equityjurisprudence embodies
is "only evidence of law."'54
The opinions in Williams and Dickey are historically and legally unsound.
At the time King James retained William Fitzhugh to draft the charter for the
Colony ofJamestown, the prevailing legal opinion was that the common law and
principles of equity were to prevail in the New World.55 Despite the historical
record that connects the founding of Jamestown to the reception statute, the late
Professor Richard Powell in his treatise Real Propertywrote: "[T]he courts of
Missouri have commendably insisted on their power to reach independent
46. 287 S.W. 657 (Mo. Ct. App. 1926).
47. Id. at 660.
48. 11 S.W.2d 278 (Mo. 1928), cert. denied,279 U.S. 839 (1929).
49. Id.; see also Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.010 (2000).

50. Dickey, II S.W.2d at 285.
51. 94N.W. 705 (Neb. 1903).
52. Id. at 708.
53. Dickey, 11 S.W.2d at 285-86.
54. Id. at 285. But see Campbell v. Colo. Coal & Iron Co., 10 P. 248, 250 (Colo.
1886) ("We use the term 'common law' in its broader sense, as including those doctrines
of equity jurisprudence which have not been expressed in legislative enactments.").
55. 1 RANDOLPH & BARRADALL, supra note 28, at 159.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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conclusions as to the operation of the common law, resorting to the decisions of
sister states for aid in this endeavor, and excepting more recent expositions ofthe
common law than those existing in England in 1607.""s Powell's argument is
premised upon the court's opinion in Reaume v. Chambers." Reaume brought
an action of ejectment to recover one-fifteenth of certain premises in the
possession of Chambers." At issue in Reaume was whether Spanish law or
common law controlled conveyance of property between husband and wife. 9
Reaume restates the doctrine in Lindell that acknowledged the adoption of the
common law under the 1816 reception statute' and the enforcement of contracts
made under Spanish law prior to the territorial reception statute." Reaume fails
to provide a scintilla of evidence relating to the history of Missouri's adoption
of the common law prior to the fourth year of James the First. Other will contest
cases, such as Robertsonv. Jones," have involved interpretation of the reception
statute, but have not addressed the plain meaning of the statute.
I-.INTERPRETATION OF OTHER STATE RECEPTION STATUTES

It should be noted that state supreme courts have reached an array of
conclusions' as to the meaning of "made prior to the fourth year of the reign of
James the First" and similar phrases in their reception statutes, though the

56. See 1 RiCHARD POWELL, REAL PROPERTY, par. 80, at 290 (1949). Other
scholars in the field of real property have taken a more diplomatic approach to how
courts have interpreted the reception statutes. In 1952, Lewis M. Simes of Hastings
College of the Law wrote: "It should be noted that, in those states where legislation
concerning the adoption of English law exists, the qualification that the adoption is made
only to the extent applicable to our circumstances and condition is made by the courts
even though not found in statute or constitution." Professor Simes lumps Missouri and
Virginia into this category. See I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY: A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES, § 1.40, at 57 (A. James Casner ed., 1952).
57. 22 Mo. 36 (1855).
58. Id. at 37.
59. Id. at 52.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 52-53.
62. 136 S.W.2d 278 (Mo. 1940).
63. The eminent Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals tried in vain to
make sense of New York's reception statute. But even Judge Cardozo's attempt to
historically detail New York's reception of the common law as an ascertainable fact
created more research problems "not to be foreclosed by a priori theories about the
'applicability' ofEnglish rules." 1 AMERIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supranote 56, § 1.40,
at 57; see Judge Cardozo's opinion in Beers v. Hotchkiss, 175 N.E. 506, 510-11 (N.Y.
1931).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss3/3
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historical record does not always support the conclusions reached by those
courts."
A. ColoradoLaw
InHerrv.Johnson,65 the Colorado Supreme Court merely refers to the year
1607 without giving any explanation as to why the territoryadopted the-common
law prior to 1607.' In Chilcottv. Hart," Colorado's Supreme Court interpreted
the state's reception law adopting the common law prior to the fourth year of
James the First as being based upon the evolving rule against perpetuities, parts
68
of which had their foundation in Elizabethan law.
B. illinois Law
Illinois has interpreted its reception statute 69 to mean the period beginning
March 24, 1606 and ending on March 23, 1607.0 Though Lasier v. Wright7
informs us that the fourth year of James the First began on March 24, 1606, this
is the extent of historical analysis. 2 Penny v. Little, 3 a little-noticed 1841
opinion, holds that the adoption of the common law prior to the fourth year of
the reign of James the First marked the "first territorial government established
in America, and with it the common law of England as it then existed." 4
C. Wyoming Lmv
Wyoming has interpreted its reception statute to mean: "The common law
is not exactly the common law of 1607." Because of decisions such as these,
which have only added to the confusion as to the meaning of"prior to the fourth
year ofJames the First," the Supreme Court of Missouri should not look to these

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See Beers, 175 N.E. at 510-11.
18 P. 342 (Colo. 1888).
Id. at 343.
45 P. 391 (Colo. 1896).
Id. at 396 (citing Smith v. Warren, Cro. Eliz. 688 (1599)).
See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/50-1 (Smith-Hurd West 1993).
See Lasier v. Wright, 136 N.E. 545, 547 (111. 1922).
Id.
See id. at 547.
4 Il.
301 (1841).
Id. at 304.

75. See Krug v. Reissig, 488 P.2d 150, 152 (Wyo. 1971); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 8-1-

101 (Michie 2001).
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jurisdictions for clarification of Missouri Revised Statutes Section 1.010.
Rather, the court should look to the decisions ofthe Supreme Court of Tennessee
for legal and historical guidance in interpreting the Missouri reception statute.
D. Tennessee Law
As noted in supra Part I(B), 6 Tennessee has held that its reception statute
of the common law prior to the fourth year of James the First is inextricably
connected with the founding of the Jamestown colony. In Glasgow'sLessee v.
Smith," Justice Overton addressed Tennessee's reception law, holding: "The
statutes contemplated by the act, were those which passed previously to the
fourth year of Jac. 1st when the charter to the colony of Virginia was granted,
which included, what was afterwards called North Carolina." 8 The Supreme
Court of Tennessee has firmly held to this early decision. InMoss v. State,79 the
court interpreted the Tennessee Constitution8 ° to mean all laws prior to the fourth
year of the reign of James the First.8
E. Arkansas Law
Arkansas's reception statute adopts the common law prior to March 24,
1606.2 The Arkansas reception statute is based upon the Julian calendar in
which March 24 marked the end of the calendar year. 3 Moore v. Sharpe is
cited as precedent in interpreting the reception statute to mean the common law
of England prior to March 24, 1606. Though the decision in Moore is statutorily
sound, it nevertheless fails to analyze the meaning of the state reception statute.

76.
77.
78.
79.

See supra,notes 25-36 and accompanying text.
1 Tenn. 144 (1805).
Id. at 154.
173 S.W. 859 (Tenn. 1915).

80. TENN. CONST., art. XI, § 10 (1870).

81. Moss, 173 S.W. at 861; see also Brice v. State, 2 Tenn. 254 (1814), to the same
effect as the opinion in Glasgow's Lessee, I Tenn. at 154-55. The Supreme Court of
Tennessee has been consistent in its historical and statutory interpretation of the phrase

"prior to the fourth year of the reign of James the First" in the state's reception statute
adopting the common law.
82. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 1-2-119 (Michie 1996).
83. See supra Part I(C) and note 37 discussing the regnal calendar of Stuart
England.
84. 121 S.W. 341 (Ark. 1909).
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CONCLUSION

Due to incomplete and, at times, inaccurate analysis, the history and plain
meaning of Missouri's reception statute have been plagued in stygian darkness.
The doctrine of anticipatory breach did not exist at the time the Susan Constant
left port in London for Jamestown in December 1606, butjudicial opinions have
liberally interpreted the "common law" to reach this result.Bs The law of
86 the court inferred that
champerty did not exist in 1607, but in Duke v. Harper,
champtery was regarded as being in force in Missouri.
The best analysis of both the plain language of Missouri Revised Statutes
Section 1.010 and the case law of Missouri and other states is that the phrase
"prior to the fourth year of the reign ofJames the First" is historically and legally
rooted in the founding of the Jamestown colony.87
In interpreting the meaning of Section 1.010, the Supreme Court of
Missouri should look to the history surrounding the founding of Jamestown, to
the colony's charter of 1606, and to the opinions of the Supreme Court of
Tennessee for guidance.
APPENDIX: STATE RECEPTION LAWS
ALA. CODE § 1-3-1 (1975) (Alabama does not state a cut-off year for the
common law in its reception statute);
ALASKA STAT. ch. 10, §01.10.010 (Michie 1962) (same as Alabama, no cut-off
year for adoption of the common law);
ARIz. REV. STAT. § 1-201 (1956) (same as Alabama);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 1-2-119 (Michie 1987) (adopts the common law prior to
March 24, 1606; this would have been the fourth year of the reign of James I; see
Moore v. Sharpe, 121 S.W. 341, 342-43 (Ark. 1909));
COLO. REV. STAT. § 2-4-211 (1998) (Colorado's reception statute specifically
adopts the common law prior to the fourth year of the reign of James I; see
Chilcott v. Hart,45 P. 391 (Colo. 1896), observing that the reception statute
adopting the common law is premised on the fact that the rule against
perpetuities began to evolve in the 1599 case ofSmith v. Warren, Cro. Eliz. 688.
In Herrv. Johnson, 18 P. 342, 343 (Colo. 1888), the Court did not engage in
historical analysis of their reception statute and why the territory and later the
State adopted the common law of England prior to the fourth year of the reign
of James I.);

85.
314 U.S.
86.
87.

See Hawkinson v. Johnston, 122 F.2d 724,728 (8th Cir.1941), cert. denied,
694 (1941).
66 Mo. 51 (1877).
See supranotes 25-30 and accompanying text.
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CONN. CONST. art. I, § 10 (no year given for reception of the common law);
DEL. CONST. sched. § 18 (reception of the common law as it existed in 1776; see
Quillen v. State, 110 A.2d 445, 450 (Del. 1955));
D.C. CODE ANN. § 49-301 (2000) (reception of the common law in force in
Maryland on February 27, 1801, the date on which Maryland ceded land to the
Federal Government for the establishment of the District of Columbia);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 2.01 (West 1998) (common law adopted down to July 4,
1776);
GA. CODEANN. § 1-1-10(c)(1) (1933 & Lexis Supp. 2000) (as the common law
existed on May 14, 1776);
HAW. REv. STAT. § 1-1 (1993) (no year set forth in the reception statute for
cutoff date of the common law);
IDAHO CODEANN. §73-116 (Michie 1999) (no year set forth in reception statute
for adoption of the common law);
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 5/50-1 (Smith-Hurd 1992) (common law adopted
prior to the fourth year of the reign of James I). (Lasierv. Wright, 136 N.E. 545,
546-47 (Ill. 1922), held: "The common law of England and all statutes of
parliament in aid thereof prior to the fourth year of King James I, except certain
specified statutes, has been in force in this state ever since, and even before, its
organization as a state, except as it has been modified or repealed by the
legislative authority." The exception to the reception statute was the State's
adoption of the English statute of frauds and perjuries of 29 Car.H, c.3, 8 Stat.
at Large 405 (1677));
IND. CODE ANN. § 1-1-2-1 (Michie 1998) (reception statute adopting the
common law prior to the fourth year of James I in 1607);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 4.2 (West 1994) (reception statute does not adopt a year as
the cutoff date);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-109 (1997) (reception statute does not set forth a cutoff
date for adoption of the common law);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.080(1) (Michie 1999) (reception law does not give
a cutoff date for the adoption of English common law);
LA. REV. STAT. § 1:16 (West 1987) (Louisiana is a civil law jurisdiction);
ME. CONST. art. X, § 3 (amended 1983) (Maine constitution does not state a year
as to adoption of the common law);
MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. 5 (amended 1992) (reception statute
adopts the common law up to July 4, 1776);
MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 6, [§ 97] (does not state a year as to when the Bay State
adopted the common law of England); see also MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 4, § 1
(Law. Co-op. 1999) (to the same effect);
MICH. CONST. art. 3, § 7 (no year set forth in constitution as to cutoff date of
adoption of the common law);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 599.03 (West 2000) (reception statute does not state a
cutoff date as to adoption of the common law of England);
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss3/3
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MISS. CONST. art. 15, § 274 (state constitutional provision does not specify a
cutoffdate as to adoption of the common law; see also MISS. CONST. sched. par.
5 (1817) (to the same effect as present constitutional text));
Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.010 (2000) (state reception law adopts the common law of
England prior to the fourth year of the reign ofJames I in 1607); compare 1816
Mo. Terr. Laws ch. 154 (same as present reception statute on this point));
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 1-1-108, 1-1-109 (1999) (under § 1-1-108 there is no
common law in any case unless declared by statute);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 49-101 (1998) (state reception law does not set forth a cutoff
date regarding the adoption of the common law);
NEv. REV. STAT. § 1.030 (1999) (state reception law does not have a cutoff date
as to the adoption of the common law);
N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 90 (does not state cutoff date as to adoption of the
common law);
N.J. REV. STAT. tit. 40A, § 1-4 (1993) (does not set forth a date for the adoption

of the common law);
N.M. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, §§ 1-3 (Michie 1998) (statute does not set forth date of

adoption of the common law);
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 14 (The constitutional provision adopts the common law
of England as it was on April 19, 1775. Judge Cardozo's opinion in Beers v.
Hotchkiss, 175 N.E. 506 (N.Y. 1931), is an erudite rendition ofthe common law,
but fails to explain why the constitutional provision adopts the common law of
England as it was on April 19, 1775. History provides the answer: April 19,
1775 marks the date when the British engaged in battle with the colonists
resulting in the "shot heard round the world." See 1 SAMuEL ELIOT MORISON
ET AL., THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 166 (6th ed. 1969));

N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 18B, § 128 (1997) (This statute does not set forth the date
of adoption of the common law. North Carolina's reception statute of 1715 used
language referring to the common law as brought over to the New World by
their "ancestors." Act of 1715, ch. 31, § 6. During the Revolutionary War,
North Carolina enacted a second reception statute, adopting the common law as
in force in 1778. When North Carolina ceded land to what is now the State of
Tennessee, it reenacted the reception statute and adopted the common law in
force in 1789. See Moss v. State, 173 S.W. 859, 861 (Tenn. 1915); Nunnely v.
Doherty, 9 Tenn. (1 Yer.) 26, 27 (1820));
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 1-01-04-1-01-06 (1987) (statute does not give cutoff year
for the adoption of the common law);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.49 (1993) (The statute does not set forth a year
stating the cutoff date for the adoption of the common law. The common law in
Ohio, however, has no effect except as judicially recognized. See McAllister v.
Schlemmer & GraberCo., 177 N.E. 841, 842 (Ohio Ct. App. 1930));
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2 (West 2000) (the statute does not have a cutoff
date for adoption of the common law);
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OR. CONST. art. XVIII, § 7 (amended 1999) (The constitutional provision does
not give a date regarding the cutoff year for the adoption of the common law.
Nevertheless, Oregon's constitution has been interpreted to mean adoption of the
common law at the time of "the American Revolution." See UnitedStates Fid.
& Guar. Co. v. Bramwell, 217 P. 332, 333-34 (Or. 1923) (en banc));
PA. R. CIv. P. 130 (the rules of civil procedure in Pennsylvania do not specify
a cutoff date regarding adoption of the common law);
P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 7 (1993) (Puerto Rico is a civil law jurisdiction);
RI. GEN. LAWS tit. 43, § 3-1 (1999) (adopts the common law prior to July 4,
1776);
S.C. CODEANN. tit. 18, § 1-170 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (does not set forth a cutoff
date for the adoption of the common law);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS tit. 2, § 14-12 (Michie 1992) (does not state a cutoff date
for the reception of the common law);
TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (the constitutional provision has been interpreted to
mean the adoption of the common law prior to the fourth year of the reign of
James I in 1607); see Brice v. State, 2 Tenn. (2 Overt.) 254 (1814); Moss v.
State, 173 S.W. 859, 861 (Tenn. 1915));
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 5.001 (Vernon 1986) (does not set forth a cutoff year
for the adoption of the common law);
UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 68, § 3-1 (2000) (does not specify a cutoff date for the
adoption of the common law);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 271 (1996) (Vermont adopts the common law and
statutes in force on October 1, 1760. Though the statute does not have a cutoff
year, the Vermont Supreme Court in Comstock's Admr. v. Jacobs, 96 A. 4 (Vt.
1915), interpreted the statute to mean October 1, 1760);
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 1-10-1-11 (Michie 1995) (Though Virginia's reception
statute does not read prior to the fourth year of James the First, it has been
interpreted to mean that. See 1 WILLIAM WALLER HENNING, STATUTES AT
LARGE... OF VIRGINIA 74 (1821); see also 1 SIR JOHN RANDOLPH, VIRGINIA
COLONIAL DECISIONS (1728-1732) 159-60, 162 (R.T. Barton ed., 1909). The
common law, however, was not formally adopted in Virginia until 1660-1661.
Id. at 162. A 1776 act of the Virginia legislature reenacted the reception of the
common law of England prior to the fourth year of the reign of James the First.
See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 96(1st ed. 1973)
(citing 9 WILLIAM WALLER HENNING, STATUTES AT LARGE... OF VIRGINIA

127 (1821));
V.I. CODE ANN. 1, § 4 (1995) (adoption of the common law as of July 1, 1921;
see Smith v. deFreitas,329 F.2d 629, 633 n.2 (3d Cir. 1964); prior to July 1,
1921, the rule of decision in the Virgin Islands was Danish law);
WASH. REV. CODEANN. §4.04.010 (West 1988) (through judicial opinions, the
state's reception law has been interpreted to mean adoption of the common law
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss3/3
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up to July 4, 1776); see In re Hudson, 126 P.2d 765, 771 (Wash. 1942);
Compton v. Evans, 93 P.2d 341, 342 (Wash. 1939));
W.VA. CODE ANN. § 2-1-1 (Michie 1994) (adoption of the common law prior to
June 20, 1863; § 2-1-1 of the state code is to be read in connection with W. VA.
CONST. art. VIII, § 13 (amended 1872));
WIS. CONST. art. 14, § 13 (amended 1848) (Wisconsin's constitutional provision
has been interpreted to mean adoption of the common law prior to the
"Revolutionary War." See Davison v. St. PaulFireand Marine Ins. Co., 248
N.W.2d 433,439-40 (Wis. 1977));
WYO. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 1-101 (Lexis 1999) (prior to the fourth year of the
reign of James I; see Krug v. Reissig,488 P.2d 150, 152 (Wyo. 1971)).
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